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Location of upstream and downstream industries
Abstract
This paper studies the issue of agglomeration versus fragmentation of vertically related industries. While
the downstream industry works under perfect competition, the upstream industry is a duopoly where each
ﬁrm supplies a diﬀerentiated input to the competitive ﬁrms. These process the inputs under a quadratic
production function entailing decreasing returns as in PENG, THISSE and WANG (2006). It is found
that fragmentation occurs if the transport cost of ﬁnal goods is medium to high, while the transport cost
of inputs is low. Otherwise, agglomeration prevails. Multiple agglomerated equilibria are possible if the
transport cost of intermediate goods is either medium or high.
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As AMITI (2005) remarked, the evolution of the location of vertically linked industries exhibits
trends of both clustering and fragmentation. For instance, in the textile sector, manufacturing is
shifted to low labour cost countries, while design and marketing are placed close to ﬁnal consumers.
This pattern characterizes a wide range of consumer goods industries.
By contrast, in more technologically industries such as the car, aerospace, pharmaceutical
and electronics, suppliers an buyers of intermediate goods usually stay close in order to save on
transport costs of the inputs, regardless of the labor intensity in their production. In the case of
the car industry, producers of parts often co-locate with assembly plants.
The diﬀerent locational pattern of vertically linked industries can be accounted for by the
diﬀerent transport costs of consumer goods and of intermediate goods. According to PAIS and
PONTES (2008), upstream and downstream ﬁrms locate in low labor cost countries if the transport
costs (both ﬁnal and intermediate) are low. Fragmentation takes place if the transport cost of
intermediate goods is low and the transport cost of ﬁnal goods is medium to high. Agglomeration
in the high labor cost countries occurs if the transport cost of the ﬁnal good is high. Multiple
equilibria (agglomeration of upstream and downstream ﬁrms in either country) take place if both
transport costs are high.
However PAIS and PONTES (2008) assume a very simple vertical structure, based on a succes-
sive monopoly where each ﬁrm produces under a ﬁxed proportions, constant returns technology.
In this paper, we introduce a more realistic structure, where a duopoly sells diﬀerentiated inputs
to competitive ﬁrms that produce under a decreasing returns quadratic technology inspired in
PENG, THISSE and WANG (2006).
In section 1, the assumptions and the structure of the game are described. In section 2, the
game is solved. Conclusions are drawn in section 3.
12 The model
We assume a spatial economy with two countries: H(ome) and F(oreign). H is a market point of
a consumer good, while F is a low labor cost location. Two upstream ﬁrms (U1 and U2) supply
diﬀerentiated inputs to a consumer good industry under perfect competition. We assume that
this industry is represented by a single competitive ﬁrm D.T h i sﬁrm charges a parametric price,
which we assume w.l.g. to be equal to 1.
All transactions of the consumer good are located in a central exchange in country H. If the
downstream ﬁrm locates in F, its price net of transport cost is given by 1−τ,w h e r eτ is the unit
transport cost of the consumer good between H and F.
Firms U1 and U2 use a unit of labour per unit of output. F is a low labor cost location,
so that wF <w H where wF,w H are wage rates. The upstream ﬁrms supply amounts x1,x 2
of diﬀerentiated inputs that are transformed in a homogeneous consumer good according to the
following quadratic production ﬁrm inspired in PENG, THISSE and WANG (2006):










with α>0,β>δ≥ 0.I nt h i ss e t t i n g ,β−δ measures the degree of sophistication of the productive
process, i.e., the degree of diﬀerentiation of the inputs. The fact that δ is nonnegative implies
that the inputs are substitutes in production. The interregional unit transport cost of the inputs
is expressed by t.
Each upstream ﬁrm charges a fob mill price, so that its proﬁt function is
πi =( pi − wj)xi, i =1 ,2;j = H,F (2)
The spatial economy is modelled through a noncooperative game with three stages:
1st Stage Firms U1,U 2 and D select simultaneously locations in {H,F}.
2nd Stage Firms U1,U 2 select prices p1,p 2 for the intermediate goods.
23rd Stage Firm D selects the amounts to buy of the inputs x1,x 2 and hence the amount produced
of the ﬁnal good.
As usual, the game is solved by backward induction in order to ﬁnd a subgame perfect equi-
librium.
3S o l v i n g t h e g a m e
In what follows, we solve the 3rd stage and the 2nd stage for each set of locations selected by the
ﬁrms. In order to solve the game quickly, the following parameter speciﬁcations are made:
α =1 0 ,β=2 ,δ=1 (3)
wh =1 ,w f =0
Let (s1,s 2,sd) be the vector of locations so that si (i =1 ,2) is the location of ﬁrm Ui and sd
is the location of ﬁrm D. Then the location subgames are as follows.
3.1 Case (H,H,H)
The proﬁt function of the downstream ﬁrm is
πd = Y − p1x1 − p2x2
where Y is given by 1. The proﬁt functions of the upstream ﬁrms are given by
π1 =( p1 − wh)x1 (4)
π2 =( p2 − wh)x2
Maximizing πd with relation to x1,x 2, we obtain the demand functions of the inputs by the



















3Substituting these outputs in 4 and maximizing with relation to p1,p 2,w eo b t a i np1 = p2 =4 .
3.2 Case (F,H,H)
The proﬁt function of the downstream ﬁrm is
πd = Y − (p1 + t)x1 − p2x2
where Y is given by 1. The proﬁt functions of the upstream ﬁrms are given by
π1 =( p1 − wf)x1 (5)
π2 =( p2 − wh)x2
Maximizing πd with relation to x1,x 2, we obtain the demand functions of the inputs by the








































The proﬁt function of the downstream ﬁrm is
πd = Y − p1x1 − (p2 + t)x2
where Y is given by 1. The proﬁt functions of the upstream ﬁrms are given by
π1 =( p1 − wh)x1 (6)
π2 =( p2 − wf)x2
4Maximizing πd with relation to x1,x 2, we obtain the demand functions of the inputs by the








































The proﬁt function of the downstream ﬁrm is
πd = Y − (p1 + t)x1 − (p2 + t)x2
where Y is given by 1. The proﬁt functions of the upstream ﬁrms are
π1 =( p1 − wf)x1 (7)
π2 =( p2 − wf)x2
Maximizing πd with relation to x1,x 2, we obtain the demand functions of the inputs by the









































The proﬁt function of the downstream ﬁrm is
πd =( 1− τ)Y − (p1 + t)x1 − (p2 + t)x2
where Y is given by 1. The proﬁt functions of the upstream ﬁrms are
π1 =( p1 − wh)x1 (8)
π2 =( p2 − wh)x2
Maximizing πd with relation to x1,x 2, we obtain the demand functions of the inputs by the
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The proﬁt function of the downstream ﬁrm is
πd =( 1− τ)Y − p1x1 − (p2 + t)x2
where Y is given by 1. The proﬁt functions of the upstream ﬁrms are
π1 =( p1 − wf)x1 (9)
π2 =( p2 − wh)x2
6Maximizing πd with relation to x1,x 2, we obtain the demand functions of the inputs by the
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The proﬁt function of the downstream ﬁrm is
πd =( 1− τ)Y − (p1 + t)x1 − p2x2
where Y is given by 1. The proﬁt functions of the upstream ﬁrms are:
π1 =( p1 − wh)x1 (10)
π2 =( p2 − wf)x2
Maximizing πd with relation to x1,x 2 we obtain the demand functions of the inputs by the
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The proﬁt function of the downstream function is
πd =( 1− τ)Y − p1x1 − p2x2
where Y is given by 1. The proﬁt functions of the upstream ﬁrms are
π1 =( p1 − wf)x1 (11)
π2 =( p2 − wf)x2
Maximizing the downstream proﬁt function with relation to x1,x 2, we obtain the demand
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3.9 Proﬁts in the ﬁrst stage game
Plugging x1,x 2,p 1,p 2 in the proﬁt functions, bearing in mind the production function 1., we can



























































































































































4 Solving the location game
We consider ﬁrst the truncated 2 × 2 symmetric game where the downstream ﬁrm locates in
country H. In order to assess the candidates of a locational equilibrium, we calculate a1 and a2,
where







(t − 1)(7t − 97)




(t − 1)(t − 31)
It is clear from 12 that:

          
          
a1 < 0 ∧ a2 > 0 if t<1 F is a dominant strategy
a1 > 0 ∧ a2 < 0 if 1 <t<97
7 H is a dominant strategy
a1 < 0 ∧ a2 < 0 if 97
3 <t<31
There are two asymmetric Nash equilibria (H,F)
and (F,H)
We deal now with the truncated 2 × 2 symmetric game where the downstream ﬁrm locates in
10F. Again we compute a1 and a2 such that








−1 (3t + 100τ − 97)(t +1 )





−1 (7t + 100τ − 93)(t +1 )
It is clear from 13 that a1 < 0 ∧ a2 > 0 for all t,s ot h a tF is a dominant strategy. Hence the
candidates to equilibrium in the game with three players are:

      
      
(F,F,H) if t < 1
(H,H,H) if t > 1
(F,F,F) for all t
We check now whether these proﬁles of strategies are indeed Nash equilibria in the location
game, i.e., whether they are robust to deviations by the downstream ﬁrm. The no-deviation
conditions are:
πd (F,F,H) >π d (F,F,F) ⇔ t<10 − 10
√
1 − τ (14)
πd (F,F,F) >π d (F,F,H) ⇔ t>10 − 10
√
1 − τ
πd (H,H,H) >π d (H,H,F) ⇔ t>−10τ − 9
√
1 − τ +9
The last condition in 14 is always met since −10τ − 9
√
1 − τ +9is negative for τ ∈ [0,1].A
suﬃcient condition so that the output of the downstream ﬁrm is non-negative is







In Figure 1, we plot in (τ,t) space the following expressions:











11Figure 1: Location regions in (τ,t) space.
5 Concluding remarks
Figure 1 shows that all location equilibria entail the agglomeration of both upstream ﬁrms in the
same country. This follows from the fact that the market for the ﬁnal good is located in a single
region. Agglomeration of all ﬁrms occurs in country F if both transport costs, t and τ,are low, so
that locations are driven by labor cost considerations only, apart from considerations related with
access to market. By contrast, agglomeration takes place in region H if τ is high and t is medium.
In this case, location of all ﬁrms is driven towards the location of the market for the consumer
good.
Two special cases are of interest. The ﬁrst one entails spatial fragmentation, the downstream
ﬁrm being located close to the consumer good market in H while the upstream ﬁrms locate in
the low labor cost country F. Unsurprisingly, fragmentation arises if t is low and τ is medium to
high. The second case entails multiple location equilibria, with all ﬁrms either choosing to settle
12in country H or in country F. This case arises if the transport cost of the inputs is high, so that
every cluster of locations is an equilibrium.
Hence, we can conclude that the location of vertically-linked ﬁrms is completely determined
by the transport costs of the inputs and of the ﬁnal good. We hope that this result, that was
reached through a numeric simulation, can generalized to a wider setting.
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